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The Growing Threat to 
   Humanitarian Operations 
by Adrian King [ HMS, Ltd. ]
Deminers and other humanitarian-aid workers around the world, though previously 
viewed as off-limits, have become targets of distrust and even violence by certain 
groups. This article explores the reasons for this shift in ideology, and what action hu-
manitarian organizations must take in order to protect their personnel. 
The days of showing respect to civilian humanitar-ian-aid personnel and organizations in the field are long gone, so that even the once sacrosanct 
International Committee of the Red Cross is no lon-
ger safe from attack. In recent times, increased rhetoric 
against the United Nations and humanitarian-aid agen-
cies, mainly from jihadist groups (such as those in the 
call-out box below), has led to a long overdue appraisal 
of the vulnerability of aid workers and U.N. peacekeep-
ing personnel as the global security situation deterio-
rates and risk of violent attack increases. 
The Developing Mindset 
Since the rise in international terrorism, providing 
aid has become more of a high-risk occupation than ever 
before. Military operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have fueled the ill-informed and biased speculation of the 
jihadists and stirred suspicion of Western motives in these 
and other regions, with aid workers often seen as agents 
of military powers. Both the United Nations and aid or-
ganizations are now viewed in some areas of the world as 
being part of a Western agenda, led by the United States 
and its allies, to suppress Islam, spread Christianity in 
the Muslim world, and support an invasion and occupa-
tion strategy directed toward Muslim countries. These 
views can be seen in the Afghan Talibans' monthly mag-
azine, Al Samood.
One only has to look at the grim record of attacks 
against personnel working for U.N. agencies and oth-
er humanitarian-aid organizations to appreciate the 
fragile and, at times, near non-existent nature of secu-
rity measures taken in the field. Humanitarian organi-
zations and personnel must understand that deprived 
populations’ access to aid must be balanced against un-
derlying security threats where, as a consequence, the 
susceptibility and accessibility of aid personnel and 
their local employees is increased, and the risk of vio-
lent compromise in certain locations is ever more likely.
Valuable Human Assets 
Personnel engaged in humanitarian work are ded-
icated to the work they do and the people they serve. 
Thoroughly commited to their vocation, these aid work-
“The UN is also standing with the enemy against Muslims
 what about the standing Muslim matters like Palestine, 
Chechnya, Cyprus ... and other Muslim matters, all these are  
evidence of the oppression of the UN against Muslim countries ...”
Al Somood, the struggle1 ( jihadist propaganda)
ers venture into areas and situations considered by most 
to have an unacceptable risk of attack or at least con-
frontation with hostile groups. These groups, for one 
reason or another, do not appreciate or support the aid 
work carried out, and because of their beliefs, view hu-
manitarian-aid workers and those who support them as 
viable targets for aggression.
In the demining world, work is often conducted in 
countries where the underlying security situation is un-
stable or where low-level conflict is in progress. How-
ever, exceptions exist. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia 
for example, mine-action activities continue effective-
ly despite widespread and ongoing violence, where no 
peaceful resolution is in sight and the situation may es-
calate at any time. In the case of Afghanistan, NATO 
maintains that its in-country presence is for the pur-
poses of stabilization and infrastructure development. 
Unfortunately, this gives the impression that the “war” 
has been won when it is apparent that ever more vio-
lence occurs daily in communities and organizations 
throughout the country.
Sanctioning the deployment of U.N.-armed military 
personnel to a country or region in crisis not only shows 
that violence is expected, but that weapons used for pro-
tection are essential to the success of legally mandated 
work in agreement between national governance and the 
United Nations. The question then has to be asked, in 
view of this decision to deploy an armed force, on what 
basis do nongovernmental organizations and private 
and commercial companies deploy their personnel to 
such areas, where the risk of attack is high and the lev-
el of protection offered is generally not commensurate 
with the threats that may be encountered?
As previously alluded to, many individuals are 
“called” to intercede on behalf of the victims of crisis 
through their vocation and belief, but what is their level 
of responsibility, both to themselves and to those who 
will support them in-country and be formally engaged 
by them in the conduct of their mission? And perhaps 
more importantly, what is the responsibility of the orga-
nizations that employ humanitarian workers? 
The posed questions are not meant to undermine 
an individual’s integrity or an organization’s justifica-
tion for carrying out humanitarian work, but to provoke 
discussion on the criteria used to guide risk assessment. 
This assessment should be conducted with the expatriate 
professionals and the local nationals involved at varying 
levels, from humble driver to mission manager. 
u.s. army soldiers assigned to the 203rd combat engineer Battalion of the Missouri army national Guard use a tracked excavator to re-
move tons of rubble and debris as rescue workers search for victims at the united nations office of the humanitarian coordinator build-
ing in Baghdad, iraq, after a truck bomb destroyed much of the building on 19 august 2003.
Photo courtesy of Master serGeant JaMes M. BoWMan, usaf
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Process and Procedure 
The Geneva Conventions of 19492 are the legal ba-
sis for categorizing humanitarian work; they guaran-
tee protection for humanitarian workers provided that 
they are not party to the conflict. The Conventions do 
not, however, give right of access to conflict areas; and 
although combatant attacks  on humanitarian personnel 
are prohibited, providing escorts is not a requirement, in-
cluding where other factions may pose a threat to safety. 
This article does not provide an analysis of all attacks 
on U.N. or other aid personnel, but in analyzing dem-
ining specifically, it is possible to draw a loose analogy 
from the evidence gathered through attacks and, in some 
cases, predict a continuance of the trend in some coun-
tries and regions. Since 2003, more than 50 mine-action 
personnel have died from non-mine related injuries, the 
majority in Afghanistan.3 The evidence shows that, in 
most cases, attacks are targeted directly at the demining 
workers and not randomly, as some believe. In the ma-
jority of the incidents, the attacks were carried out using 
small arms and improvised explosive devices, the latter 
of which are a well-known threat in Afghanistan and a 
growing threat globally, and which allow precise target-
ing without exposure to retaliation or identification of 
the perpetrator(s) at the incident scene.
Deminers as Targets
Mine action is an activity built on military breach-
ing and explosive ordnance disposal skills to remove 
area explosive hazards, thus allowing repatriation of 
displaced persons and communities following the con-
flict and enabling infrastructure renewal and a return to 
normal life activity. For the majority, mine action would 
be seen as an essential and normal part of a country’s 
post-conflict recovery process, and many would perhaps 
struggle to understand why people would oppose such 
action taking place. The reality is not so simple, howev-
er, and in assessing the chronological data of attacks on 
demining personnel, one has to surmise that a political 
motive is often the basis for the incident. In Afghanistan, 
the Taliban see the United Nations and other aid organi-
zations as collaborators with NATO’s International Sta-
bilization Force and corruptors of the Muslim religion, 
views echoed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
For these reasons, attacks on the United Nations 
and humanitarian-aid workers, including demining 
personnel, are justified in the perpetrators’ minds, but 
aid workers’ links with sponsors and other organiza-
tions may further strengthen motives, as in the case of 
the lethal attack on deminers in Kandahar province on 
11 April 2010, where the Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) sponsored the 
victims’ demining activity. This extra “link” (i.e., the 
sponsorship) may provide an additional motive for an 
attacker to target one aid group over another and should 
possibly be part of the risk-assessment process.
Another possible motive for attacking deminers in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere is because mine action re-
moves resources from the Taliban’s arsenal. Their use of 
explosive remnants of war as main charges in their IEDs, 
or even as a viable ammunition source, is well known. 
“The UN is a tool of American global politics, duping people by 
claiming that it is a neutral international organization, where it is in 
fact a criminal American institution; the presidential election in Ka-
bul is evidence enough of this. This organization has not been 
established to support and help people, and since it was es-
tablished, it has taken part and contributed to war crimes ...
In the same way the invader forces will be forced to leave  
Afghanistan; this institution called the UN must leave for good ...”
~ Al Somood. the struggle”1 ( jihadist propaganda)
This was recognized in Iraq during 
the height of the insurgency, where 
foreign contractors were deliber-
ately used to remove explosive ord-
nance from stockpiles and former 
battle positions in an attempt to in-
terrupt the chain of activities that led 
to building IEDs to attack Coalition 
troops.
Protecting Deminers
As employers, humanitarian de-
mining organizations have a duty of 
care and responsibility toward their 
personnel. Top-level personnel must 
thoroughly investigate the risk of at-
tack and assess and mitigate against 
apparent threats in the country and 
region of the proposed work activity. 
At the lower levels, the duty extends, 
through managers and team leaders, 
to enacting and maintaining the se-
curity plan and providing local op-
erating procedures and resources in 
managing the risks described. 
The threshold for conducting or 
suspending mine-action operations 
due to security concerns is usually 
a responsibility of the mine-action 
coordination center, if present in-
country, normally on advice from 
a number of internal and external 
agencies. Yet is this enough? Is it 
sufficient, and is it justifiable in high 
threat-level locations such as Af-
ghanistan and Somalia? Surely with 
the growing threat levels, aid orga-
nizations in general should take a 
more responsible stance in provid-
ing levels of security. If it is known 
that attacks are likely and that re-
prisals may also be visited on local 
workers as a result of mine  action 
or any other humanitarian activity, 
the decision to deploy at all should 
be questioned.
The United Nations, which over-
sees demining and other contracts, 
should perhaps also play its part by 
ensuring organizations and individu-
als are aware of the inherent risks of 
working in a particular country or 
region and that they are taking the 
proper security precautions. Person-
nel validation should begin prior to 
arrival in the country and should in-
clude checks to make certain that em-
ployees are sufficiently briefed and 
trained on safety issues, and pro-
vided with the resources, including 
procedures and equipment, to safe-
ly conduct their work. However, this 
should only happen after an organi-
zation understands the risks involved 
and has determined whether it is pru-
dent to allow the commencement or 
sustainment of humanitarian demin-
ing activity in a specific area. 
 see endnotes page 82
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